On Monday, 14th September, senior advocate Mahesh Jethmalani delivered a hard-hitting critique of the Indian legal ecosystem, raising profound concerns over institutional failures and the sharp drop in public trust facing the judiciary. Speaking before a high-profile audience in New Delhi, Jethmalani focused on several critical issues: the scandal surrounding former Justice Yashwant Varma, the opaque nature of collegium appointments, the complete absence of a unified database to track complaints against judges, growing corruption within statutory tribunals, and the endless procedural delays that continue to choke the delivery of justice.

Throughout his address, Jethmalani placed particular focus on the destructive presence of “fixer lawyers” who act as illicit intermediaries, actively undermining the integrity of the courts. He was speaking at the 6th edition of the Ram Jethmalani Memorial Lecture—a flagship gathering attended by Union Minister for Law and Justice Arjun Ram Meghwal, Chief Justice of India Surya Kant, eminent legal counsel Harish Salve, and several other senior legal luminaries and dignitaries.

The Cash-at-Home Episode of Justice Varma

Opening his address, Jethmalani pointed directly to the high-profile cash-at-home scandal involving Yashwant Varma, who served on the benches of both the Allahabad and Delhi High Courts. Grounding his argument in institutional accountability, he remarked: “Transparency in the legal system must start with those responsible for delivering justice, i.e., the judiciary. A depressing scandal unfolded, as we are all aware, when a fire in the outhouse of an active high court judge revealed that it housed burnt and partially burnt sacks containing cash in Rs 500 denominations.”

Jethmalani presented empirical data to illustrate how severely the incident eroded public confidence in the judicial system. He cited Daksh, an independent Bengaluru-based public policy research organisation established in 2009 that focuses on justice reform, noting that their 2017 findings showed 60 to 70% of respondents possessed complete faith in the judiciary as an institution.

Drawing a stark contrast, he pointed to the aftermath of the cash discovery: “On the other hand, a C-voter India Today survey conducted soon after the fire incident to gauge public sentiment towards the judiciary in the wake of the controversy found the following: 30% fully trust the judiciary, 12% somewhat, 48% do not trust it at all and 10% had no opinion.”

Despite the public fallout, Jethmalani acknowledged that the leadership of the judiciary moved with urgency and clear intent. “Varma was removed from all judicial responsibilities, and a panel of three judges was formed to investigate the issue. The results exposed that he had authority over the outhouse,” he noted, consciously setting aside other findings of the inquiry committee that he considered outside the immediate scope of his talk.

Tracing the legal sequence of events, Jethmalani recalled that Varma moved the Supreme Court twice—first to challenge the findings of the three-judge inquiry committee, and subsequently to halt parliamentary proceedings initiated for his impeachment. “Both attempts were dismissed, and the judge ultimately resigned in April of this year. While this brought a temporary end to that chapter, it would have been fitting for C-Voter India today to analyse public confidence in the judiciary after his ouster.”

While suggesting that the swift administrative handling of the case likely helped repair public perception, Jethmalani flagged that no First Information Report (FIR) has been registered even after a year and a half. Addressing the legal technicalities, he observed: “It is true that the judge has resigned and ceases to be a public servant. Hence, no sanction is required for initiation of an investigation.”

He then highlighted the jurisdictional ambiguities stalling further action: “The question is who sets the process in motion. So this is a little bit of a grey area. Can the police or the CBI (Central Bureau of Investigation) submit an FIR?” Citing legal precedent, he questioned whether the Chief Justice of India must formally advise the President to authorize a criminal probe. Regardless of the legal hurdles, Jethmalani stressed that decisive, unequivocal steps remain essential given the widespread damage the controversy inflicted on the judiciary's reputation.

Absence of Transparency in Collegium Appointments

Shifting his focus to institutional mechanics, Jethmalani criticized the lack of openness surrounding the collegium system responsible for recommending judicial appointments and transfers in the higher judiciary. He argued that institutional opacity creates fertile ground for allegations of favoritism, nepotism, and arbitrary victimization.

Turning to systemic oversight, he emphasized: “Moreover, surveys show that the public’s perception of judicial corruption is currently at its highest level within the subordinate judiciary. There is no transparency about the number of complaints against subordinate judges that have been reported to the vigilance mechanisms across various states. The National Judicial Data Grid (NJDC) primarily functions as a database for court cases, orders, judgments, and information on pendency and disposal.”

Jethmalani highlighted a glaring institutional blind spot: the total absence of a dedicated national tracking system for complaints against high court, Supreme Court, or subordinate judges, as well as the outcomes of disciplinary probes. “Such a database is imperative if corruption at all levels of the judiciary is to be eradicated, since any delay in dealing with these complaints can be detected in real time and checked,” he added.

He made a direct appeal to the Chief Justice of India to establish a nationwide, publicly accessible database to restore citizen confidence, emphasizing that state governments have consistently failed to publish verifiable records of judicial complaints and subsequent actions.

To underscore the point, he cited the rare data available from one state: “Uttarakhand, a relatively small state, stands as an exception where, from January 2020 to April 2025, its High Court vigilance mechanism received 258 complaints related to judicial corruption, of which only four led to disciplinary or criminal proceedings. The question of whether this low figure is due to frivolous complaints or a lackadaisical review can only be answered by a comprehensive database and an evaluation of the nature of those complaints.”

Mounting Graft and Delays in Specialized Tribunals

Jethmalani subsequently addressed the growing friction and delays within specialized quasi-judicial bodies, especially tribunals operating under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC). He noted that chronic adjournments and backlogs directly subvert the core rationale behind establishing tribunals—speedy, specialized dispute resolution.

To remedy the breakdown, he placed two concrete proposals on the table: “There are only two alternative solutions available to address this issue. One remedy involves closely monitoring the activities of these tribunals. This would require the formation of a national tribunal data grid that not only tracks the number and pendency of cases before the tribunal but also includes complaints against tribunal members submitted to the vigilance mechanism and their resolutions.”

However, he sounded a cautionary note: “Its success hinges on the transparency of tribunal operations and the eradication of corruption. A recent public interest litigation presented to the Supreme Court recommended the creation of a national data grid for tribunals, similar to the national judicial data grid that it plans to introduce.”

Jethmalani recounted that while the Supreme Court dismissed the public interest litigation on technical grounds—clarifying that the 7,000 slots assigned under apex court modernization projects were earmarked strictly for E-courts and tribunals—it granted the petitioner liberty to approach the Ministry of Law and Justice.

Directing his appeal to Law Minister Arjun Ram Meghwal, Jethmalani laid out the second structural alternative: “The second alternative is for Parliament to entirely abolish the tribunalisation of the bankruptcy code and return the bankruptcy jurisdiction to the High Court, as was once advised by the late Fali Nariman.”

Fixer Lawyers and Structural Rot Within the Bar

Concluding his address, Jethmalani placed the responsibility for systemic rot squarely on corrupt elements within the legal profession itself: “The bar must conduct a thorough introspection of its own involvement in perpetuating postponements and corruption within our legal system.”

He directly tied institutional corruption to illicit dealmakers within the profession: “The existence of corruption in the judiciary or tribunals is contingent upon the activities of fixer lawyers who manipulate the legal system by facilitating bribery. Those within the bar are well aware of their identities. Their names are probably available to intelligence agencies and should be conveyed to the Supreme Court collegium if this has not yet been done.”

Demanding strict deterrent action against attorneys who function as intermediaries rather than advocates, he asserted: “The future of the bar should belong to lawyers who believe only in winning their case on merits. In other words, the bar should be a repository of lawyers who know the law and not the judge.”

The broader debate over bench fixing and forum shopping previously drew sharp public scrutiny during high-profile bail hearings involving anti-Hindu Delhi riots accused Umar Khalid, where senior advocate Kapil Sibal's courtroom maneuvering sparked widespread controversy, alongside overt defenses of these practices by media commentators like Rajdeep Sardesai.

Turning his scrutiny toward the administrative bodies governing lawyers, Jethmalani remarked: “It is a trying shame that it was not until this year, via a petition presented to the Supreme Court, that the public became aware of the prolonged holdups in elections for various state bar councils and the restructuring of the bar councils of India, which have persisted for years and, in some instances, for decades.”

He added with equal indignation: “It is also a crying shame that there was an effort to extend the tenure of the chairman of the Bar Council of India for a duration of 5 years until 2030, rather than adhering to the mandated 2-year term as stipulated by the Act.”

Jethmalani concluded by outlining how the petition before the Supreme Court exposed entrenched nepotism and financial irregularities within the Bar Council leadership, including attempts by entrenched functionaries to retain perpetual control over powerful public trusts. As he stated, “They might cease to be a part of bar council but continue to be associated with the crucial trust.” Commending the petitioners for bringing these critical matters before the top court, Jethmalani stated that he, along with the broader legal fraternity, keenly awaits the Supreme Court's verdict.