The 16th of December is marked as Vijay Diwas, or Victory Day, in both India and Bangladesh. On this day, the Indian Armed Forces, fighting alongside Bangladeshi freedom fighters, defeated the occupying Pakistani forces in 1971.

The war lasted for nine long and violent months and ended with a decisive Indian victory and the birth of Bangladesh as an independent nation. Thousands of Indian soldiers laid down their lives during the 1971 War. Their courage and sacrifice are remembered with honour and pride across generations.

Yet, behind the visible heroism on the battlefield existed another layer of dedication that remained largely unseen. These were the unknown ‘Dhurandhars’ of the Research and Analysis Wing, or RAW, who worked quietly in the shadows. Without seeking recognition, they played a decisive role in shaping the outcome of the war and ensuring India’s historic triumph.

The need for a strong external intelligence agency became clear after India faced serious challenges during the 1962 Sino-Indian War and the 1965 Indo-Pak War. These conflicts exposed intelligence gaps that India could no longer afford. As a result, RAW was established in 1968. Rameshwar Nath Kao, widely known as RN Kao, became the architect of this new organisation. Starting from the ground up, he recruited capable minds, built intelligence networks, developed covert operational abilities, and laid the foundation for what would soon become a highly effective intelligence agency. Under his leadership, RAW emerged as a formidable force in foreign intelligence gathering and secret operations carried out in India’s national interest.

Rising Tensions in East Pakistan: Early Alerts and RAW’s Strategic Vision

Pakistan was created in 1947 after the partition of undivided India, based on religious identity. From the beginning, the country was dominated by its military leadership. Over time, this dominance grew unchecked and became destructive for Pakistan itself. East Pakistan, which is now Bangladesh, faced continuous political, economic, religious, linguistic, and cultural discrimination from West Pakistan. The people of East Pakistan were treated as second-class citizens, and resentment steadily grew against the occupying forces from the west.

While India’s direct military intervention on 3rd December 1971 is widely known, what remains less discussed is RAW’s earlier role in East Pakistan. Before the Indian Army formally entered the conflict, RAW was already active on the ground, conducting guerrilla-related intelligence work and preparing the conditions that would later support a successful military campaign. This hidden phase is a crucial chapter that deserves recognition from both Indians and Bangladeshis.

In Pakistan’s general elections of 1970, the Awami League, led by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, won 167 out of 169 seats in East Pakistan. By democratic norms, the party had a clear mandate to form the government. However, the West Pakistani leadership, including President Yahya Khan and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, refused to hand over power. This refusal sparked widespread protests across East Pakistan.

The situation worsened when Pakistani forces launched Operation Searchlight. The operation involved widespread killings, rape, and brutal violence against Bengali civilians, students, intellectuals, and Hindus. More than 3 million people were killed in what was a systematic genocide. The brutality ordered by Yahya Khan led to one of the largest refugee crises in history, with over 10 million Bengalis fleeing into India.

RAW had already warned the Indian government as early as April 1969 about rising unrest in East Pakistan. Intelligence reports pointed to growing anger among Bengalis against the dominance of Urdu-speaking Punjabi elites from West Pakistan. RAW correctly predicted that Pakistani forces might resort to extreme violence, which could trigger a full-scale revolt and strengthen demands for independence. RN Kao advised Prime Minister Indira Gandhi to keep the option of direct military intervention open. This foresight allowed India to prepare not just militarily, but also diplomatically, for what lay ahead.

RAW successfully infiltrated intelligence networks inside East Pakistan. Through these networks, it gathered real-time information about Pakistani troop movements, political repression, and the daily suffering of the Bengali population. This steady flow of intelligence became a crucial advantage in the months that followed.

The Kao Strategy: Training, Arming, and Empowering the Mukti Bahini

RN Kao designed a detailed strategic blueprint that later became known as the ‘Kao Plan’ or the ‘Kao Bangla Plan’. The plan focused on exploiting Pakistan’s weaknesses, including its geographical separation, economic imbalance, ethnic and cultural divisions, and, most importantly, the oppressive attitude of West Pakistani rulers toward Bengalis. RAW officers, often referred to as the ‘Kaoboys’, carried out intelligence collection, covert missions, and psychological operations with precision.

One of RAW’s most important contributions to Bangladesh’s liberation was its role in building and supporting the Mukti Bahini. From early 1971, secret training camps were set up under Operation Jackpot along the India–East Pakistan border. RAW, working closely with the Indian Army, trained between 83,000 and 1,00,000 Bengali freedom fighters. This included a specialised Mujib Bahini of around 10,000 young men loyal to Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. These fighters were trained in guerrilla warfare, sabotage techniques, and intelligence gathering. Lieutenant General Jagjit Singh Aurora supervised their training and operational activities.

RAW combined its intelligence expertise, weapons, and logistics with the determination of the Bengali fighters. The Mukti Bahini carried out hit-and-run attacks, destroyed power infrastructure, looted weapons from police stations, and disrupted railway lines and bridges. In several areas, they managed to tie down Pakistani troops, weakening the overall defence system and cutting vital communication links.

These continuous guerrilla attacks created fear and uncertainty within the Pakistani forces. Administrative control in rural areas collapsed as police stations fell one after another. In response, Pakistan formed auxiliary forces such as the Razakars, Al-Badr, and Al-Shams to regain control. This move proved disastrous. Mukti Bahini fighters targeted these groups with ease, further weakening Pakistani authority.

The slogans of ‘Joy Bangla’ and the flags of the future nation of Bangladesh became powerful symbols of resistance. They haunted Pakistani forces and signalled the inevitable loss of East Pakistan. RAW intensified psychological and sonic warfare, helping freedom fighters spread slogans, rumours, leaflets, songs, and symbolic messages. These efforts crushed morale and sent a clear warning that Pakistani rule was nearing its end.

RAW’s involvement went beyond armed training. Bengali civil servants and bureaucrats in both West and East Pakistan were quietly brought into RAW’s network. These insiders provided critical intelligence, which was passed directly to Mukti Bahini units operating on the ground.

Beyond these efforts, RAW also carried out lesser-known but highly impactful operations such as the ‘Ganga’ false flag operation, Operation Eagle, and counter-insurgency actions in India’s Northeast. These operations disrupted Pakistani logistics and deeply unsettled their military leadership. RN Kao was aware that Pakistan was transporting large numbers of troops to East Pakistan by air. To counter this, he planned a bold operation aimed at stopping these overflights across Indian airspace, setting the stage for the next decisive phase of the conflict.

On 30th January 1971, RAW carefully orchestrated the hijacking of an Indian Airlines aircraft named “Ganga”, which was flying from Srinagar to Lahore. The hijackers pretended to be Kashmiri separatists. After ensuring that all passengers were safely released, they set the aircraft on fire. This incident was not an act of random violence but a calculated move. The Indian government used the hijacking as a legitimate reason to immediately ban Pakistani aircraft from using Indian airspace.

This single decision had a far-reaching impact. Pakistan’s ability to move troops, weapons, and supplies quickly from West Pakistan to East Pakistan was severely affected. With Indian airspace closed, Pakistan was forced to rely on a much longer alternative, a nearly 5,500 km sea route. This logistical burden slowed down deployments, weakened supply lines, and effectively isolated Pakistani forces stationed in the East. The airspace ban became a silent yet powerful chokehold that played a critical role in delaying reinforcements and reducing Pakistan’s operational flexibility.

After Yahya Khan returned from Dhaka to Karachi in March 1971, Pakistani forces unleashed full-scale violence against the Bengali population. RAW became aware that Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was about to be arrested and conveyed this information to him. Mujib advised his close aides to go into hiding, but he chose to remain at his Dhanmondi residence. On 26th March 1971, he was arrested by Pakistani forces. Soon after, RAW intercepted the Pakistan Army’s coded message stating “the bird is caged”. This message was quickly picked up by the Indian media and broadcast globally, alerting the world to Mujib’s arrest and the worsening situation in East Pakistan.

As the crackdown intensified and genocide unfolded, the Indian government realised that non-intervention was no longer an option. The scale of violence and human suffering made it clear that India would eventually need to step in to protect the Bengali population from annihilation.

The genocide and mass rape in East Pakistan were led by then Army chief General Yahya Khan. Even conservative estimates indicate that more than 200,000 Bengalis were killed. In a deliberate and systematic campaign of sexual violence, Pakistani soldiers and Razakar militias raped between 200,000 and 400,000 Bengali women and girls. The brutality reached such extremes that many women lay motionless, appearing lifeless, while the assaults continued.

When Prime Minister Indira Gandhi discussed India’s military strategy, the responsibility of preparing the battlefield was given to RAW. RN Kao was tasked with ensuring that when the Indian Army moved in, it would be able to deliver a final and decisive blow. Along with his trusted team, including K Sankaran Nair, head of the Pakistan desk, PN Banerjee, head of Bangladesh operations, and Brigadier MBK Nair, head of RAW’s technical division, Kao ensured that every detail was meticulously planned.

In April 1971, a Bangladesh government-in-exile was established in Calcutta, with Mujib Nagar declared as its capital. A dedicated Bangladesh radio station was also set up in Mujib Nagar to keep the people of East Pakistan informed about developments and the plans of their government-in-exile. Notably, PN Banerjee, then joint director of RAW in Calcutta, served as the overall in-charge of this setup, ensuring smooth coordination and communication.

At the same time, RAW launched Operation Eagle in partnership with the Special Frontier Force, a Tibetan paramilitary unit under RAW’s command. This operation focused on the Chittagong Hill Tracts. Led by Brigadier Sujan Singh Uban, SFF commandos carried out sabotage missions, destroyed key bridges, and harassed Pakistani units such as the 97 Independent Brigade and the 2 Commando Battalion. Brigadier Uban acted on RN Kao’s clear directive, “Uban, sabotage and harass them. Get into their heads. Destroy what you can. Bring back the Chittagong Hill Tracts”, and executed one of RAW’s most secret and daring missions.

Operation Eagle resulted in limited Indian casualties, with 56 personnel killed and 190 wounded. Despite this, the operation successfully prevented Pakistani forces from entering Myanmar and played a crucial role in weakening Pakistan’s grip over the region. To avoid a wider conflict and secure India’s eastern front, RAW also conducted counter-insurgency operations against Naga and Mizo insurgent groups that were receiving backing from China and Pakistan.

Confident in their belief in military superiority and ideas such as Muslim ‘martial race’ dominance and ‘Kalma ki Taqat’, Pakistan’s leadership remained complacent, even after losing two previous wars to India. RN Kao, however, remained alert. On 3rd December 1971, the Pakistan Air Force launched ‘Operation Chengiz Khan’, carrying out pre-emptive airstrikes on several Indian airfields in the western sector. This marked the formal beginning of the Indo-Pakistan War.

Pakistan deployed more than 50 aircraft, including F-86 Sabres, B-57 Canberras, and Mirage IIIs, targeting Indian runways, radar stations, and hangars. The objective was to cripple Indian Air Force operations. What Pakistan did not anticipate was that RN Kao had already foreseen such an attack. RAW had warned Indian authorities well in advance, allowing protective measures to be put in place. As a result, the airstrikes caused minimal damage, while the Indian Air Force retaliated by destroying several Pakistani aircraft.

RN Kao had earlier detailed this possibility in a 24-page secret note sent to Prime Minister Indira Gandhi on 4th January 1971. He warned that Pakistan might attack India militarily to divert attention from East Pakistan. Indian forces remained on high alert. It is reported that after 48 hours of waiting without an attack, the Air Chief expressed doubts. Kao advised waiting another 24 hours. The very next day, the PAF launched its strike, only to lose four fighter jets while inflicting little damage on Indian airfields.

Kao’s timely intelligence not only blunted Pakistan’s air offensive but also strengthened India’s diplomatic position. Pakistan’s aggression provided India with clear justification to enter the war.

How RAW Secured India’s Decisive Win and Enabled Bangladesh’s Freedom

RAW’s wide-ranging efforts, including early intelligence warnings, training and logistical backing of Bengali freedom fighters, covert operations, diplomatic groundwork, and psychological warfare, ensured that once the Indian Armed Forces entered the conflict, victory followed swiftly and decisively.

The Indo-Pakistan War lasted only 13 days and ended with the surrender of 93,000 Pakistani troops in Dhaka on 16th December 1971. This moment, often remembered for the symbolic surrender ceremony, marked one of the most decisive military outcomes in modern history.

As a result of the courage and sacrifices of Indian soldiers and Bengali freedom fighters, an independent Bangladesh was born. For RAW, still a relatively young agency at the time, the war proved its ability not only to safeguard India’s territorial integrity but also to support neighbouring populations facing extreme oppression.

Pakistan’s founder, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, once declared that “No power on earth can undo Pakistan”. Yet, within just over two decades, India played a central role in undoing half of Pakistan, decisively disproving that claim and reshaping the history of South Asia forever.